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ABSTRACT 
 
WSNs are susceptible to a variety of attacks. These attacks vary in the way they are 
performed and executed; they include but not limited to node capture, physical tampering, denial 
of service, and message alteration. It is of paramount importance to protect gathered data by 
WSNs and defend the network against illegal access and malicious insertion of data that would 
alter the entire integrity of the system. The severe resource constraints in each sensor make it a 
challenge to secure the network. The need for new security ideas was the main inspiration and 
motivation of this research. While there has been a remarkable progress in many enabling 
technologies for sensor networking, the integrity of information received by the system has 
received less attention [50]. For instance, while many methods have been developed for self-
organizing the network functions, less attention was paid to ensure high data integrity. 
While most the security mechanisms focus on confidentiality, we focus on integrity and 
freshness of the message. In order to achieve a secure system, security has to be integrated into 
every component. Sometimes security is viewed as a standalone component of a system’s 
architecture, where a separate module provides security. This separation is a very flawed 
approach to network security. Components designed without security in mind can become a 
point of attack. The integrity model describes how data items in the system should be kept valid 
from one state of the system to the next. To define a security model, it requires specifying both 
the security requirements and the threat model.    
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks 
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves into 
the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it” [49]. One of the main reasons 
that wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have come to prominence in the past couple of years is 
because they hold the potential to revolutionize many segments of our economy and daily life. 
They are transforming the way we live, work and interact with the physical environment. WSNs 
are very small, inexpensive and smart. The magnitude of their impact has a wide spectrum that 
goes beyond environmental monitoring and conservation, but also impacts business asset 
management, health care and military. All this would not be possible without the recent 
technological advances that made it feasible to deploy small, low-power, low-bandwidth, and 
multifunctional wireless sensor nodes to monitor and report the conditions and events of their 
local environment. This kind of network could be deployed in large-scale and complex 
environments collecting and aggregating data in real time, transforming it to meaningful 
information, and keeping the end user aware of the events witnessed and prepared to take proper 
actions if needed. A major benefit of WSNs is helping us understand and better manage our 
increasingly interconnected physical world [3]. Mark Weiser, the father of Ubiquitous 
computing, mentioned in his article published in 1991 that computers will merge with the 
environment more and more until they become completely invisible to the user [4]; as a result, 
this is putting WSN in the front seat of Ubiquitous Computing [5].  
WSN set a new paradigm for large-scale distributed systems and information gathering 
based on the collaborative efforts of a large number of self-organized nodes [48]. With their 
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limited energy, computation and communication capabilities they pose unique security 
challenges that make current existing security mechanisms inadequate. Moreover, theses nodes 
are deployed in accessible terrain adding the risk of a physical attack. It only takes one 
compromised node to jeopardize the entire network. We can see the importance of this new field 
by the number of recent funding initiatives including Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) SENSIT program, military programs, and NSF Program Announcements. If 
WSNs are going to be the eyes and ears of our future society, then there is a need in asking “how 
can we trust the information provided by the sensor networks?” For these networks to be useful, 
the information they provide must be of a high integrity. The decision making process can go 
askew if the network provides misleading picture of the physical world and what it is sensing and 
reporting. 
WSNs are susceptible to a variety of attacks. These attacks vary in the way they are 
performed and executed; they include but not limited to node capture, physical tampering, denial 
of service, and message alteration. It is of paramount importance to protect gathered data by 
WSNs and defend the network against illegal access and malicious insertion of data that would 
alter the entire integrity of the system. The severe resource constraints in each sensor make it a 
challenge to secure the network. The need for new security ideas was the main inspiration and 
motivation of this research. While there has been a remarkable progress in many enabling 
technologies for sensor networking, the integrity of information received by the system has 
received less attention [50]. For instance, while many methods have been developed for self-
organizing the network functions, less attention was paid to ensure high data integrity.   
Our research focuses on studying the characteristics of sensor networks and their 
behavior. We compare the current known threats and attacks facing this kind of network and 
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look at the challenges facing the development of new security models. We discuss confidentiality 
of a message versus its integrity. For some application, confidentiality is not of a great 
importance as long as the message obtained from the sensor node maintains a certain level of 
integrity. Information integrity is maintained by preventing corruption of data items in a system 
due to either error or malicious intent. Our integrity model is based on David D. Clark and David 
D. Wilson integrity model [44] with primary concern of formalizing the notion of information 
integrity. While most the security mechanisms focus on confidentiality, we focus on integrity 
and freshness of the message. In order to achieve a secure system, security has to be integrated 
into every component. Sometimes security is viewed as a standalone component of a system’s 
architecture, where a separate module provides security. This separation is a very flawed 
approach to network security. Components designed without security in mind can become a 
point of attack. The integrity model describes how data items in the system should be kept valid 
from one state of the system to the next. To define a security model, it requires specifying both 
the security requirements and the threat model. Our model does not discuss mobile sensors nodes 
or physical interference with the message like noise in the environment, congestion, or climate 
change. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Definitions  
Confidentiality: ensures that a transmitted message cannot be understood by anyone else and 
can be accessed by the intended nodes.   
Data Integrity: ensures that the transmitted message is original and has not been altered 
throughout the transmission.  
Authentication: allows for communicating parties to know the identities of each other in order 
to make sure they are genuine.  
Availability: ensures the availability of network services whenever it is required by the intended 
parties.  
Ubiquitous Computing: all models of ubiquitous computing (also called pervasive computing) 
share a vision of small, inexpensive, robust networked processing devices, distributed at all 
scales throughout everyday life and generally turned to distinctly common-place ends. 
2.2 Wireless Sensor Networks: Design and Architecture  
Sensor networks are defined as a large number of self organizing, low power, low cost 
wireless nodes that are deployed en masse monitoring a certain phenomenon; they could be 
deployed inside the phenomenon or very close to it [7]. Figure 1 shows a typical sensor network 
and its major components: 
1. Sensor field  2. Sensor nodes  
3. Sink   4. Task manager 
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Figure 1: Sensor nodes scattered in a sensor field [9] 
Each of these nodes is equipped with its own sensor, processor, memory, power source, 
and radio transceiver.  Sometimes, depending on the application that the network is serving, a 
GPS serves as the 6th element (figure 2). These nodes are not tamper-proof; it is infeasible to 
keep them low-cost while packaging them in a tamper resilient package. Such networks are 
exposed to internal and external attacks [8]. The position of the sensor nodes need not to be 
engineered or predetermined. This allows random deployment in inaccessible terrains or disaster 
relief operations. Each of these nodes has the capability to collect data and route it back to a 
more powerful resource, referred to as sink or base station [7]. The sink is a more powerful node 
and it acts as a gateway to another network; it has a powerful processor with significant storage 
space as well as an unlimited power source that makes it outlive other nodes. All nodes transmit 
their aggregated data to the sink, which in return relays it to other reliable communication means 
and on to the task manager where user intervention is needed. 
6 
 
 
Figure 2: Sensor node components 
 
Network topology in WSN can be configured in different topologies: 
 1. Single-hop star 
 2. Multi-hop mesh and grid 
 3. Tier hierarchical cluster 
Single-hop star topology: Each node communicates directly with the sink. This is the 
simplest design for a WSN as the networking concerns are reduced to the minimum. This 
topology has many drawbacks; it’s neither scalable nor robust. For instance, in large networks, 
distant nodes from the sink will have a big wireless link disadvantage. 
Multi-hop mesh and grid: A larger area network, multi-hop routing is necessary as shown in 
figure -. Nodes can form a mesh graph and communicate with the sink. A major weakness of this 
topology is that for very large networks, each node has to keep a routing table in its memory of 
all the nodes. 
Power Unit 
Sensor ADC 
Processor 
Storage 
Transceiver 
Location finding system Mobilizer 
Sensing unit 
Processing 
unit 
Power 
generator 
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Hierarchical cluster: This is the kind of network we see deployed in large areas where a 
group of nodes within a certain region in the network report to different cluster-heads. There are 
several ways to implement this kind of topology; one is that the cluster-head will be known in 
advance to the network and has power that would surpass the life of the nodes in its region.  The 
other approach is to change the cluster-head for each region periodically, giving the task to each 
node. This has a great advantage for scalability and management; it divides a big network into 
separate zones where each zone aggregates its data locally before sending it to the cluster-head.  
Then the cluster-head will send the data to either another cluster-head or directly to the sink.  
2.2.1 Protocol Stack 
Like any telecommunication device, sensor nodes has a specific network stack; research 
is still being conducted to determine how to optimize the protocol stack [9] (figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: OSI model, WSN, and distributed system in WLAN protocol layers 
8 
 
Physical Layer: Responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency generation, signal 
detection, modulation and data encryption. Thus far, the 915 MHz ISM band has been widely 
suggested for sensor networks. This layer is a fertile research area and is widely unexplored; 
current open research issues range from power-efficient transceiver design to modulation 
schemes.  
Data link Layer: Ensures reliable point-to-point and point-to-multi-hop connections in the 
network. It is responsible for medium access, error control, multiplexing of data streams and data 
frame detection. Conventional MAC protocols are not suited to sensor networks due to the 
network constraints.  The MAC protocol in a wireless multi-hop self-organizing sensor network 
should satisfy two objectives [7]: one is to create the network infrastructure and the other is to 
fairly and efficiently share communication resources between other sensor nodes. Data link layer 
protocols include: Eavesdrop and Register (EAR) [10], CSMA-Based medium Access Protocols 
[11], and Self-Organized Medium Access Control for Sensor Networks (SMACS) [10]. There is 
considerable work and research to be conducted in this layer; some of the obvious include power 
saving modes of operation, error control coding schemes and MAC for mobile sensor networks. 
Table 1 gives a brief qualitative overview of MAC protocols. 
MAC protocol Channel access 
mode 
Sensor network 
specifics 
Power conservation 
SMACS and 
EAR 
Fixed allocation of 
duplex time slots at 
fixed frequency 
Exploitation of 
large available 
bandwidth 
compared to sensor 
data rate 
Random wake up 
during setup and 
turning radio off while 
idle 
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Hybrid 
TDMA/FDMA 
Centralized 
frequency and time 
division   
Optimum number 
of channels 
calculated for 
minimum system 
energy 
Hardware-based 
approach for system 
energy minimization 
CSMA-based Contention-based 
random access 
Application phase 
shift and pre-
transmit delay 
Constant listening 
time for energy 
efficiency 
Table 1: A qualitative overview of MAC protocols for sensor networks [7] 
Network Layer: Responsible for routing information through the sensor network and finding the 
most efficient path for the packet to travel on its way to the destination. Most protocols can be 
categorized under one of the following techniques: gossiping, flooding, SMECN (Small 
Minimum Energy Communication Network) [12], SPIN (Sensor Protocols for Information via 
Negotiation) [13], SAR (Sequential Assignment Routing) [10], LEACH (Low Energy Adaptive 
Clustering Hierarchy) [14] and Directed Diffusion [15]. Table 2 gives some details about each of 
these protocols. 
Network layer 
scheme 
Description 
 
SMECN Creates a subgraph of the sensor network that contains the 
minimum energy path 
Flooding Broadcasts data to all neighbor nodes without regard to if they 
have received it before (or not) 
Gossiping Sends data to one randomly selected neighbor 
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SPIN Sends data to sensor nodes only if they are interested; has three 
types of messages (i.e., ADV, REQ, and DATA) 
SAR Creates multiple trees where the root of each tree is one hop 
neighbor from the sink; selects a tree for data to 
be routed back to the sink according to the energy resources and 
additive QoS metric 
LEACH Forms clusters to minimize energy dissipation 
Directed diffusion Sets up gradients for data to flow from source to sink during 
interest dissemination 
Table 2: An overview of network layer schemes 
Transport Layer: Very little literature was found on this layer; protocols of this layer are yet to 
be explored. In general, these protocols are needed when the sensor network needs to be 
accessed through the Internet. The proper approach, since nodes are limited in power, is to 
suggest a UDP-type of protocol. 
Application Layer: Responsible for representing required information to the application used in 
the network and propagate requests from the application down to the lower layers.  
2.3 WSN vs. MANETs 
Probably the closest technology to WSN is Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs); the two 
share many characteristics. To mention just the obvious, they both don’t have a fixed network 
topology, the nodes are connected wirelessly, and power is an expensive resource [4]. Still both 
networks vary in many respects [16] 
1. The number of sensor nodes in a sensor network is extremely bigger than the one of ad 
hoc network. 
11 
 
2. Sensor nodes are densely deployed. 
3. Sensor nodes are prone to failure. 
4. The topology of a sensor network changes frequently. 
5. Radio range of sensor nodes is much less than MANETs. 
6. Ad hoc networks use a point-to-point communication paradigm, while sensor networks 
rely on broadcast. 
7. Sensor nodes are limited in power, computational capacities and memory. 
8. Because of the large number of nodes, sensor nodes may not have global identification. 
9. Sensor nodes should have a trust relationship with other nodes; this is not assumed with 
ad hoc networks. 
An ad hoc network is set up to meet an immediate communication need instantly. While 
WSN have to interact with the environment, their traffic characteristics are different than other 
human-driven forms of networks [17]. Furthermore, MANETs are associated with different 
applications and different equipment; a node in ad hoc networks could be a laptop or PDA with 
plenty of battery and processing powers. Another major difference is the human interaction in 
MANETs; there is a constant monitoring of the network. Both are required to self-organize once 
deployed, but the difference is in the traffic load and routing protocols that save energy [17]. 
Power conservation is an important issue to extend the life of WSN and neither MANET nor 
Bluetooth protocols can be used.  
     MANETs support routing between any pair of nodes [18, 19, 20, 21]. Most traffic in WSN 
can be classified into one of three categories [9]:  
1. Many-to-one: Multiple sensor nodes send their reading to the sink or an aggregation 
point. 
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2. One-to-many: The sink multicasts a query or control information to many nodes. 
3. Local communication: Nodes send each other messages to localize themselves and 
discover their neighbors to coordinate with each other. 
Since nodes sense the same phenomenon, they do not have to report the same reading to the 
sink multiple times. Instead, they process and aggregate the data among each other, discard any 
duplication, and then send it to the sink; this will reduce traffic and save energy. 
Some security issues related to ad hoc networks are similar to those found in sensor networks, 
but the defense mechanisms developed for ad hoc networks are not applicable to sensor networks 
[22]. For instance, ad hoc networks use encryption to ensure authentication based on public key 
cryptography [23, 24, 25, 26], which is too expensive for sensor nodes to process.  
2.4 WSN Security Barriers 
Limitations set by WSN lead to a very demanding environment to provide security [8]. 
Security techniques used in traditional networks cannot be applied directly. Here, it is more than 
just message encryption.  In fact, in many applications, encryption is not an important security 
goal of wireless sensor networks. The most important security goal is to ensure that any message 
received has not been modified in any way and is from the sender which it claims to be. There 
are other applications where security is of an ample importance, such as in disaster relief, public 
safety, home healthcare and military [27]. The network should be resilient to individual node 
failure, which could be a result of battery exhaustion, node physical destruction, or potential 
imperfection in large-scale production. Network continuity and functionality, even with 
disruption, is a critical challenge facing WSN. 
1. Unreliable Transfer: This is a major threat to WSN. The entire network relies on defined 
protocols and communication for security. Packets between nodes are transmitted in a 
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connectionless manner, which can be unreliable. These packets may be dropped at highly 
congested nodes. Some of the code is used for handling errors; if the protocol lacks this feature, a 
security packet might be lost in transition (e.g., a cryptographic key) [28].  
2. Conflicts: With the broadcast nature of WSN, packets may collide in the middle of a transfer 
even with existing reliable channels. If packets meet in the middle, conflict will occur thus 
causing a failure of the transfer. This could be a significant problem in highly populated 
networks [7, 28]. 
3. Latency: Three major factors stand behind latency in the network and lack of synchronization 
between nodes: multi-hop routing, network congestion, and node processing. This is very 
important in networks that rely on cryptographic keys for synchronization [29, 7, 28]. 
4. Physical attack exposure: In many applications, sensor nodes are left unattended for long 
periods of time. The sensed field could be vulnerable to adversaries and inclement weather, thus 
leaving nodes exposed for physical attacks [28, 30, 7, 17]. 
5. Remote management: It is nearly impossible to manage the network physically; all 
management should be done remotely. In particular, when nodes are deployed in a hostile 
environment, this makes it impossible to have physical contact with the network.    
6. Lack of central management point: If the network was not well thought out in the design 
phase, it could be fragile, inefficient and unorganized. Once deployed, it’s very difficult to 
correct these errors. [30, 28] 
7. Key establishment: Cryptographic keys are essential in the setup phase of a WSN for future 
use. This is a classical problem that researchers have been studying for decades now; several 
protocols have been proposed to address this problem. As mentioned earlier, WSN pose new 
challenges that render these protocols impractical.  
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2.5 WSN Security Requirements 
Securing communication in a very large network constructed of thousands of unattended 
constrained nodes makes security a challenging task with the unique requirements. Various 
factors are worth mentioning at this point: 
- Nodes depend on each other for correct operation. 
- Messages have to be transmitted over several hops, since direct communication 
between arbitrary nodes is impossible due to limited radio range. 
- Nodes have little knowledge of other distant nodes [26]. 
It is unfortunate that security is still looked at a separate component or a module that 
could be patched after the design is completed. To achieve a secure system, security mechanisms 
should be integrated into every component [30]; no component should be designed without 
security. 
The major requirements for security in WSN could be summarized in the following 
domains: 
  Authentication  Availability 
  Data Confidentiality  Data Integrity 
  Data Freshness  Secrecy 
  Robustness   Privacy 
Each item in the above list is a complete domain by itself, and is a research topic 
evolving as we speak. This research interest is focused on data integrity.  
2.6 Cluster-Based Routing Protocols 
This section will give a brief introduction about cluster-based routing protocol, which is 
the most popular research area in routing protocols for WSN. 
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Global goals of the network could be achieved via routing protocols; these protocols 
coordinate the activities of individual nodes in an efficient manner. In a cluster-based routing 
protocol, nodes are grouped in an efficient way to relay messages to the sink. Each group has a 
cluster head that acts like a gateway. In some protocols, these cluster heads suffer less from 
energy constraints, while in other protocols a cluster head could be any regular node in the 
group. The main objective of a cluster head is to aggregate data received from the group, check 
its validity, and then send it to the sink as a group representative. 
The main advantage of cluster-based protocols is energy conservancy and minimizing 
latency. Current research is being conducted on factors affecting cluster formation, cluster head 
communication and data aggregation. Several protocols have been proposed [31], but the most 
promising ones are LEACH and PEGASIS. 
Challenges facing a cluster-based routing protocol can vary depending on the application 
it addresses. Mobility and self-configuration/reconfiguration is a huge challenge.  
 2.7 Attacks and Countermeasures 
Many sensor network routing protocols have been proposed, but none of them have been 
designed with security as a goal. [9] These protocols are simple in nature; this is why they are 
susceptible to attacks. It is important to mention that attackers can have much more energy at 
their disposal than the sensor nodes and radio signal could be much higher than the one operating 
on the node.  All security measures carried out by a sensor node require energy, so stressing the 
network with attacks at a constant level can cause premature power depletion. 
2.7.1 Attacks on Protocol Stack 
Many applications served by WSN can be security-sensitive, and attacks against these 
networks might cause real-world damage to the health and safety of people. 
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2.7.1.1 Physical Layer: Jamming and tampering are the most common attacks on this layer.  
 1. Jamming interference with radio frequencies the nodes are using. Jamming a certain 
percentage of nodes could disrupt the network’s operation. If the adversary has powerful 
machine, s/he could jam the entire network. 
 2. Physical attack and node capture. It is economically infeasible to make nodes tamper-
proof because of the cost increase. An adversary could capture a node and replace parts of its 
hardware or try to gain access to data and cryptographic keys. 
2.7.1.2 Data Link Layer: Attacks relevant to this layer could take different forms: collision, 
unfairness and battery exhaustion. 
 1. Collisions: It is similar to link layer jamming. If the adversary was able to change or 
corrupt an octet of transmission creating a mismatch in checksum, then the entire packet is 
disrupted.   
 2. Unfairness: This attack could be launched by abusing MAC priority schemes leading 
to missing real-time deadlines, resulting in service degradation.  
 3. Battery exhaustion: Could be as a result of naïve link layer implementation’s attempt 
to repeatedly retransmit a packet after late collision.  
2.7.1.3 Network Layer: Attacks against different routing protocols could fall in [9] one of the 
following categories: 1. spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information, 2. selective 
forwarding, 3. sinkhole attacks, 4. sybil attacks, 5. wormholes, 6. HELLO flood, and 7. 
acknowledgement spoofing. 
1. Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information: This is a direct attack where the 
attacker can complicate the network by creating routing loops by spoofing, altering or even 
replaying routing information.  This attack could be carried out by targeting routing information 
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exchanged between nodes partitioning the network, creating false-error messages, and by 
increasing latency from end-to-end.  
2. Sinkhole: If this attack is launched successfully, traffic will be lured from a particular 
area through the adversary’s node. One objective of this attack is to make the compromised node 
look attractive to the surrounding nodes with respect to their routing algorithms. Another 
objective is that it lays a path for launching selective forwarding attacks.  
 3. Selective forwarding: In a multi-hop network, the assumption is that participating 
nodes will faithfully forward messages received. In this kind of attack, the adversary includes 
himself/herself in the path of data flow to be effective. Malicious nodes may refuse to forward 
certain packets or simply drop them, acting like a black hole.  
 4. Sybil attack: The objective of this attack is to have the malicious node advertise 
multiple identities confusing the nodes around it. Sybil attacks targets fault-tolerant schemes 
such as distributed storage [32], disparity [33] and multi-path routing [35]; furthermore, it poses 
a big threat to geographic routing.   
5. Wormhole: The adversary tunnels messages received in one part of the network over a 
low latency link to another part of the network where the messages are then replayed. An 
adversary could convince far nodes in the network, which are typically multiple hops away from 
sink, that they are one or two hops close to the sink through the wormhole. These attacks are 
commonly set up to appear through two colluding malicious nodes. A smart way to launch these 
attacks and conduct them without being noticed is to couple them with sybil and selective 
forwarding attacks. 
6. HELLO flood attack: In many protocols, broadcasting a HELLO packet to the 
neighboring nodes announcing its location is very common. An attacker with a powerful 
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machine and antenna could convince the entire network that s/he is their neighbor. Nodes placed 
at a large distance from the attacker will be sending their messages into oblivion, leaving the 
network in a state of confusion.  
 7. Acknowledgement spoofing: Using the fact that some routing algorithms choose the 
next hop based on reliability issues, an adversary could advertise a weak or even a dead link as a 
strong reliable one.  
Table 3 below lists various protocols with the relevant attacks associated with them.  
Protocol Relevant attacks 
TinyOS beaconing Bogus routing information, selective 
forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes, 
HELLO floods 
Directed diffusion and its multipath variant Bogus routing information, selective 
forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes, 
HELLO floods 
Geographic routing (GPSR, GEAR) Bogus routing information, selective 
forwarding, Sybil 
Clustering based protocols (LEACH, TEEN, 
PEGASIS) 
Selective forwarding, HELLO floods 
Rumor routing Bogus routing information, selective 
forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes 
Energy conserving topology maintenance 
(SPAN, GAF, CEC, AFECA) 
Bogus routing information, Sybil, HELLO 
floods 
Table 3: Summary of attacks against sensor networks protocols 
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Another building block in sensor networks is time synchronization between nodes. 
Traditional time synchronization protocols cannot be used in sensor networks due to the same 
constrains mentioned above. Several protocols are proposed to tackle this unique problem; 
unfortunately, none of them have been designed with security in mind. In addition to the attacks 
listed in the previous table, an additional threat is posed against time-synchronization protocols. 
All attacks of this nature have the same goal in mind, which is to convince some nodes that their 
neighbors’ clocks are at a different time than they actually are. Since global time synchronization 
is built upon synchronization at the neighborhood level, this will disrupt the mechanisms by 
which the protocols maintain global time in the network or allow events at distant points in the 
network to be given time stamps that reflect the actual difference between their times of 
occurrence [34]. The most widely used protocols include Reference Broadcast Synchronization 
(RBS), Time-sync Protocol for Sensor Networks (TPSN), and Flooding Time Synchronization 
Protocol (FTSP). Designing a secure time synchronization protocols is a vital task for a proper 
functionality of the entire network, especially time-dependant applications. 
2.8.2 Countermeasures 
Many countermeasures have been proposed to defend against these attacks, yet none of 
these countermeasures have proved to be a good solution since they haven’t been implemented 
on either the software or the hardware level. A detailed discussion about countermeasures could 
be found in [7, 9, 36, 37, and 38]. 
2.8.2.1 Jamming: There are a few techniques to defend against this attack by using spread 
spectrum communication. Another proposed solution is the use of code spreading similar to the 
ones used in mobile phones, but this kind of solution requires more design, power and cost.  
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2.8.2.2 Tampering: Motes may be programmed to delete sensitive information upon tampering 
since it is not economically feasible to tamper-proof packaging. Another approach proposed in 
[39] is to increase the effort of the adversary to run a successful attack. For example, data may be 
stored at a subset of nodes in the network and continuously be moved around by the sensors to 
evade possible access by the adversary. This makes it harder for the adversary to choose which 
node to capture. In the worst case, the adversary must capture much more than t out of n nodes to 
access the data in question.  
2.8.2.3 Collision: Adding collision detection to the protocol could solve this problem, but it 
hasn’t been proved fully effective.  
2.8.2.4 Spoofed, altered or replayed data: By introducing link layer encryption and 
authentication, we can prevent outside attacks. The problem with the proposed solution is the use 
of a global key; once this key has been compromised, the entire network is at stake. And more 
so, this technique proves useless if the attack was launched from inside. 
2.8.2.5 Selective forwarding: Introducing multi-path routing to the network could prevent this 
attack from occurring; this will give the message an opportunity to reach the destination using 
several paths with the hope that one of them will reach it, given that not all nodes are 
compromised. This is an expensive approach and would overwhelm nodes with the same 
message.  
2.8.2.6 Sybil attack: An insider node cannot be prevented from participating in the network, but 
then the attacker is restricted to use identities from the same network. Therefore, identities must 
be verified and using public key cryptography, and checking digital signatures is beyond the 
scope of sensor networks. A good approach is to have every node share a unique key with the 
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base station, and then nodes could verify one another using a Needham-Schroeder-like protocol 
and establish a shared key.  
2.8.2.7 HELLO flood attack: These kinds of attacks can be easily avoided by verifying bi-
directionality of a link between two nodes before taking meaningful action based on a message 
received over that link.   
2.8.2.8 Wormhole and sinkhole attack: These are one of the most difficult attacks to prevent, 
especially when the two are coupled together. Wormholes use invisible channels to the network 
and the advertised routes of sinkhole attacks are extremely hard to verify. Geographic routing is 
immune from these attacks because messages are routed to the physical location of the sink; false 
links are easily detected by neighbors once they figure out that the physical distance of the 
advertised route exceeds the signal range of the motes. Another proposed solution is tight time 
synchronization but this is extremely expensive and requires a new protocol to handle it.  
Table 4 below summarizes attacks and proposed countermeasures. 
Attacks Countermeasures 
Bogus routing information, Sybil 
attacks, HELLO floods, and 
acknowledgement spoofing, 
 
Link-layer encryption and authentication, 
Multi-path routing, identity verification, bidirectional 
link verification, and authenticated broadcast 
Sinkhole attacks and wormholes They pose significant challenges to secure routing 
protocol design, and it is unlikely there exists effective 
countermeasures against these attacks that can be 
applied after the design of a protocol has completed. 
Geographic routing protocols are one class of protocols 
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that holds promise. 
Table 4: Attacks and suggested countermeasures 
2.9 Cryptographic Primitives  
Wireless sensor networks operating over insecure wireless channels and nodes are 
deployed in the public, which makes them an easy target by an adversary. The standard approach 
for keeping sensitive data from leaking out is to employ encryption and encrypt the data with a 
key known only by the receiver [8]. Since sensor nodes are constrained with computational 
power, memory and energy, using asymmetric cryptography like RSA signature algorithm or the 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is too expensive. On the other hand, a better approach is 
to use symmetric cryptographic alternatives like AES block cipher or the HMAC-SHA-1 
message authentication code. A major drawback of symmetric cryptography is that it is not as 
versatile as public key techniques which complicate the design of secure applications [40]. 
Another important issue is scalability; security techniques should be capable of scaling to large-
scale deployments. Problems occur at the early setup phase of the network, where shared secrets 
need to be distributed either by the manufacturer at production time or by clever protocols at 
deployment time [41, 42, 39]. 
2.9.1 SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks 
SPINS is a suite of security building blocks proposed by A. Perrig et al.; highly-
constrained sensor nodes [43]. The first design was for the first generation of sensor nodes Rene, 
which had very scarce resources. Later it was applied on Mic2 motes. SPINS has two blocks to 
it: SNEP and µTESLA. 
SNEP: Sensor network encryption protocol; it provides data confidentiality, two-party data 
authentication, and data freshness. 
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µTESLA: Micro version of the Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication; is an 
authenticated broadcast protocol; it relies on asymmetric mechanism to allow nodes receiving a 
broadcast message to verify the authenticity of the message [34, 36, 43]. The mechanism is based 
on the arrival time of the messages. 
A major drawback in this protocol is that it assumes that nodes have a global identifier; 
this is not applicable in sensor nodes lacking identifiers.  
2.9.2 TinySec 
Link layer security architecture based on TinyOS. TinySec claims to protect authenticity, 
integrity and confidentiality of messages between neighbor nodes. It provides two security 
operations: authenticated encryption (TinySec-AE) and authentication-only (TinySec-Auth). It 
uses Skipjack and RC5 cryptographic algorithms. Although this protocol shows much strength, it 
fails to address the attacks of jamming, key compromise, replay and denial of service.  
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CHAPTER 3. MESSAGE INTEGRITY 
Message integrity addresses the threat of unauthorized manipulation of data. Given the 
challenges we mentioned earlier, there is couple of frequent questions asked that needs to be 
addressed: “When the data is kept confidential, does it mean it is safe from tampering?” Another 
common question is “How can the end user rely on the information provided by the sensor 
network?” With the implementation of confidentiality, it will be difficult for the adversary to 
steal it; however, this doesn’t mean its safety. An attacker can change the data and send the 
sensor network into disarray [28]. For instance, a malicious node may add some fragments or 
manipulate the data within the packet; this new packet can be sent to the original receiver. Data 
loss or damage can occur from harsh communication environments. Hence, data integrity ensures 
any received data has not been altered in transit. Cryptographic and authentication mechanisms 
alone cannot be used to solve this problem as internal adversarial nodes will have access to valid 
keys [2]. Besides, sensor nodes are also vulnerable to system faults and non-malicious 
malfunctioning of transceiver due to harsh communication generating faulty data. Such behavior 
is outside the realm of cryptography [2]. 
Current proposals for routing protocols in sensor networks optimize for the limited 
capabilities of the nodes and the application-specific nature of the networks, but do not consider 
security. These protocols were designed without security as a goal [9]. It is unlikely a sensor 
network routing protocol can be made secure by incorporating security mechanisms after design 
have been completed. 
3.2 Clark-Wilson Integrity Model 
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What is so unique about the Clark-Wilson Integrity Model [44, 45] is that it uses 
transactions as the basic operation, which models very well with WSNs. Each node has to relay 
sensed data from the environment to its neighboring node or to the cluster head if it is near.   
The distinctive property of well-formed transaction transitions the system from one consistent 
state to another consistent state through a well defined series of operations. In this model, a 
secure system should have the following characteristics: 
 - prevent unauthorized disclosure or theft of information 
 - prevent unauthorized modification of information 
 - prevent denial of service attacks 
Traditional threats the system should have countermeasures for: 
- system penetration by unauthorized user 
- unauthorized actions by authorized user 
- abuse of special privileges by systems programmers and facility operators 
In most of WSN applications, preventing unauthorized data modification is of a greater 
importance than preventing disclosure. That is the core idea of this model.  
It is important to mention what is needed from this model; mainly, there are two main points to 
defend: 
1. There is a distinct set of security policies related to integrity rather than disclosure, 
which are often of highest priority in most WSN applications. 
2. Some separate mechanisms are required for enforcement of these policies. 
Two mechanisms at the heart of fraud and error control: 
1. The well formed transaction 
2. Separation of duty 
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Since this model was developed for commercial use, the simple example that 
accompanies it is drawn from the same environment. Let D be today’s deposits, W is the amount 
of money withdrawn today so far, YB is the amount of money in all accounts at the end of 
yesterday, and TB is the amount in all accounts so far today. With a well-formed transaction 
system, the bank accounts should be balanced satisfying the integrity constraint:  
D + YB – W = TB 
3.2.1 The Formal Model 
The first step is to label data items in the system to which the integrity model should be 
applied; these data items are called constrained data items (CDIs). The desired integrity policy is 
defined by two classes of procedures [44, 45]: integrity verification procedures (IVPs) and 
transformation procedures (TPs). IVPs confirm that all the CDIs in the system conform to the 
integrity specification at the time the IVP was executed. TPs correspond to well-formed 
transactions; it takes the set of CDIs from one valid state to another other. A valid state maintains 
its integrity when the system ensures that only TPs can manipulate and handle the CDIs. It is a 
valid assumption that the system is in a current valid state because an IVP was executed to verify 
it. If we return to the bank example: 
 CDIs = Balances in the accounts 
 IVP = Checking if the accounts are balanced 
 TPs = Depositing, withdrawing and transferring money 
To ensure that the bank is managing the accounts correctly, a bank examiner must certify 
that the bank is using proper procedures to check that the account is balanced.   
The integrity assurance is a two-part process: 
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1. Certification: Done by the security officer, system owner with respect to an 
integrity policy. 
2. Enforcement: Done by the system.   
3.2.2 Clark-Wilson Rules 
The model [44, 45] could be summarized in certification rules (CRs) and enforcement 
rules (ERs) 
CR1: When an IVP is run, it must ensure that all CDIs are in a valid state. 
CR2: For some associated set of CDIs, a TP must transform those CDIs in a valid  
          state into a (possibly different) valid state. 
Note that a TP may corrupt a CDI if it is not certified to work on that CDI. 
Access control rules: 
 ER1: The system must maintain the certified relations and must ensure that the only TPs 
certified to run a CDI manipulate that CDI. This means that if f operates on o the (f, o) ? C where 
C is the set of certified relations. 
 - This defines a set of triples (user, TP, {CDI set}) to capture the association of  
   users, TPs and CDIs. 
 -  These triples define a relationship called “allowed relation”. 
CR1, CR2 and ER1 provide the basic framework to ensure internal consistency of the CDIs. To 
provide a mechanism for external consistency, we need additional rules: 
- ER2: The system must associate a user with each TP and set of CDIs. The TP may 
access those CDIs on behalf of the associated user. The TP cannot access that CDI on 
behalf of a user not associated with that TP and CDI. The relation could be in the 
form of (UserID, TPi, (CDIa, CDIb, CDIc, …)). 
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- CR3: List of relations in ER2 must be certified to meet the separation of duty 
requirement, i.e. allowed relations must be certified.  
- ER3: The system must authenticate the identity of each user attempting to execute a 
TP. 
All TP execution should be logged to provide audit trail. To implement this, another CDI 
is used with an associated TP that only appends to the existing CDI value. 
- CR4: All TPs must be certified to write an append-only CDI logging enough 
information necessary to permit the nature of the operation to be reconstructed.  
There is one more component to the integrity mode in that not all data is constrained data. 
In addition to CDIs, most systems contain data items not covered by the integrity policy. These 
data items are called unconstrained data items UDIs. Example of UDIs could fall under data 
entered from a keyboard. 
-CR5: Any TP that takes a UDI as an input value must be certified to perform only valid 
transformations, or else no transformations for any possible value of the UDI. The 
transformation should take the input from a UDI to a CDI or the UDI is rejected.  
For the model to be effective, the various certification rules must not be bypassed leading 
to separation of duty section. 
- ER4: Only the certifier of a TP may change the list of entities associated with a TP. 
No certifier of a TP, or of any entity associated with that TP, may ever have execute 
permission with respect to that entity. 
3.3 Clark-Wilson vs. Biba 
Another model, as important is as Clark-Wilson is Biba integrity model [BIB77]. Biba 
constructed a model for preventing inappropriate modification of data. It is dual to Bell-La 
29 
 
Padula model. The reason why Biba wasn’t considered in this research as the foundation like 
Clark-Wilson is the fact that Biba defines integrity levels, which are analogous to the sensitivity 
levels of the Bell-la Padula model. This property makes it an inadequate approach since in a 
cluster-head network, each node can become a cluster-head at any time destroying the integrity 
levels constructed by Biba. Other reasons worth mentioning, it is hard to determine the integrity 
labels. While it is hard to implement in real systems, Biba provides no mechanism to support 
data consistency.  
Instead of data and user level classification, Clark Wilson model places strict controls on 
what programs have permission to manipulate certain data, and what users have access to these 
various programs. This feature makes it a reasonable approach for WSN.  
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CHAPTER 4. WSN MESSAGE INTEGRITY MODEL 
             Based on our research and literature provided, there is no well founded integrity model 
developed for WSN. Although Clark-Wilson encompasses all objectives regarding integrity: user 
integrity, data integrity and process integrity; we cannot apply it the as it is.  One of the main 
limitations that Clark-Wilson has is that it is hard to formalize it; which works to our advantage 
since we will modify it to serve our research goals. Its strengths lie in its well-formed transaction 
preserving data integrity and separation of duty. We are concerned in how we can apply these 
strengths while designing a system with high integrity.  
Our model is based on these requirements:  
1. Trusted subjects: initial nodes. 
2. Trusted Code: all application codes and static data for any trusted subject must correspond to 
known and trusted hashes. 
3. Information Flow: all information flowing to a trusted subject must come from another trusted 
subject. 
4. Initial Verification: initial verification procedure code must be of high integrity. 
5. Message payload: the message payload must be the same en route from its origin to 
destination. 
In this model, we assume WSNs are homogenous (they contain the same hardware and 
software configuration) and static (nodes do not move after deployment). Moreover, we assume 
that data confidentiality is not important for that specific application. The goal is verifying the 
exchanged content between communicating participants of the WSN have been altered. Figure 3 
shows system architecture for habitat monitoring. 
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Figure 3. Wireless sensor network monitoring habitat 
 Once the nodes are in place, a cluster based routing protocol groups the sensor nodes to 
relay sensed data to the base station efficiently. Each cluster of nodes has a cluster head.  In [47], 
a proposed election mechanism is introduced of cluster heads. This method will reduce the 
likelihood of a compromised and malicious node from being selected as a cluster head. This 
approach though does not scale to all nodes, but is a mechanism that addresses a potential breach 
from the early distribution of the nodes.  
Clustering facilitates data aggregation and is an energy efficient technique where nodes 
forward data to cluster heads for processing and then transmit the findings to the base station. 
The designer could use broadcast, multicast or anycast in communications; this method is very 
effective. Figure 3 shows how a hierarchical approach breaks the network to many segments and 
layers. Aggregated data travel from a lower clustered layer to a higher one until it reaches the 
sink. A hierarchical based cluster based moves data faster to the base station; this reduces latency 
and is more power efficient.  
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Environmental and habitat monitoring is a great example for an application where 
confidentiality is not of a great importance but data integrity is paramont. We have mentioned 
earlier many examples of wireless sensor networks, but we believe that environmental 
monitoring is a domain where they have a huge impact. Sensor nodes could sense events like 
pollution or ice melting, and at the same time reporting pressure, temperature and wind speed. 
Since WSN consists of multiple identical nodes collaborating in a cluster set to achieve 
one goal, which is sensing the surrounding area. For each sensed phenomena, there will be a 
service initiated at node level to communicate with the cluster head. Note, other nodes in the 
same cluster layer and proximity will sense the same phenomena and report. Depending on the 
network design, nodes could sense once every second or minute; this is something set by the user 
during application development cycle. The initiation of sensing is referred to as initiation 
service. As we have explained in chapter 3, all data items used in this model can either be 
constrained data items (CDIs) or unconstrained data items (UDIs). If the nodes are sensing 
multiple items, each data group should be handled with a different initiation service. 
After the nodes are in place and cluster layers are formed, the first sensed reading occurs. 
At this time, the data being sensed is dealt with as UDI by all nodes. Once the reading is 
captured, this data becomes a CDI. To maintain the integrity of the CDIs, we have the integrity 
verification procedures (IVPs) and transformation procedures (TP). It is worth remembering here 
that IVPs ensures that all CDIs meet the integrity constraints of the system before the second 
round of sensation. This guarantees that the system is in a valid state. 
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A major advantage for this state machine kind of process is that after the initiation 
services has been executed, and TP ensured that all CDIs are consistent, the data is preserved 
from any alteration to that state even if a malicious node was introduced.  
Each node could be a sensing node or a cluster head, depending on the characteristics 
described earlier. This means that each node is equipped with a node transformation procedures 
and cluster-head transformation procedures. The node transformation procedures are executed 
between nodes while data gathering and the cluster-head transformation procedures are executed 
with cluster heads communicate aggregated data. This means that for the system to stay in a 
valid state, all procedures should complete successfully and all services moved to another valid 
state. 
Certification Rule 1: when IVP is run, it turns all UDIs to CDIs ensuring that all CDIs in a valid 
state. 
Certification Rule 2: all CDIs are associated with an initiation service. Each initiation service is 
responsible for its own CDIs enforcing separation of duty. 
 Since we are dealing with multiple CDIs and multiple services, there might be 
inconsistency between nodes. Cluster head must be to ensure that data gathered by different 
services from different nodes are consistent and should rule out any inconsistencies. 
Certification Rule 3: cluster-head must be able to ensure data consistency from nodes 
Enforcement Rule 1: the system must maintain the certified relations and must ensure that the 
only TPs certified to run a CDI manipulate that CDI. 
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 The formal model of Clark Wilson assigns users to TPs. In our framework, nodes and 
cluster-heads could act as users; but each TP can manipulate only a certain set of CDIs. 
Enforcement Rule 2: the system must associate a nodes with each TP and CDIs. 
 In this model, taking Clark Wilson as the base; we took advantage of the major two 
principles in it: separation of duties and well formed transaction to ensure integrity. While we 
focus on the latter, the first principle is important but it is beyond the scope of this research. This 
model defines a higher abstract notion of transaction. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
             The main contribution of this work is to establish an integrity model for WSN and help 
design a network that sustain high information integrity for a long duration [50]. In this research 
we have presented a mechanism for message integrity in WSN that is based on Clark Wilson 
integrity model. The impact this model is very broad, it will benefit the scientific that are using 
sensor networks as well as the environmental ones where integrity is more of a concern than 
confidentiality. Moreover, it gives the designer the freedom to use the proper way of 
implementation. Our approach is a top-down one and is capable of describe sufficient conditions 
to protect and preserve the integrity of sensed data.  
              In this research, we presented a new way to preserve message integrity. Our approach is 
based on Clark Wilson integrity model in which each cluster head verifies if the previous cluster 
head has preserved the integrity of the message using a set of rules.   
             Integrity in WSN is still a new research topic and there is a lot of room for improvement. 
Our model needs to be tested for design, robustness and scalability. A major research topic is 
physical security and non-malicious behavior (like channel noise, snow, rain, dust etc). 
Improving in this field takes a lot of effort and collective work. A researcher team should have 
access to expertise in spanning statistics, networking, signal processing, hardware and software 
platforms, and information and security.  
When confidentiality is not a major requirement in a network, our model ensures message 
integrity especially in environmental monitoring which would reveal previously unobservable 
phenomena in the physical world [46]. 
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This model fails to address sensor mobility and heterogeneity of nodes; if the network is 
comprised of two or more types of sensor nodes then the model must be adapted on both 
application and node levels. Tests need to be implemented on the robustness and scalability of 
this model. Another major research topic that could help our model is building reputation 
between nodes and ensures trustworthiness among them after a certain period of deployment.  
 A routing protocol lacking security from early design stages leaves us with a 
vulnerable network that could be easily compromised. 
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